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The Assembly,
(i) Disturbed by the fact that the year of the ffiieth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations is
also the year in which the highest number of armed regional conflicts has been recorded throughout the
world, although the United Nations is involved by means of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and
peace-making operations with a view to re-establishing peace and security in the areas concerned;
(ii) Considering that most of today's armed conflicts causing the worst destruction and human casual-
ties are not taking place between but within member states of the United Nations;
(iii) Condemning Russia's military operations against the civilian population of Chechnya where basic
human rights, as recognised in the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of the
OSCE, continue to be violated;
(iv) Stressing that in combating terrorist activities such as those pursued by Kurdish PKK it is necessary
to respect the appropriate proportion of means and the fundamental principles of intemationally recogni-
sed human rights;
(v) Firmly convinced that a continuous political dialogue with the religious movements, of increasing
importance particularly in the Islamic world, in a spirit of tolerance and mutual understanding is still cru-
cial in order to avoid mutual misunderstanding and growing discontent tuming religious movements into
political and even terrorist violence;
(vi) Convinced that the United Nations can come to gnps with the new challenges stemming from the
changing nature of armed conflicts only if its member counffies are prepared:
(a) to give the United Nations their full support as the only existing universal organisation devoted
to the maintenance of international peace and security;
(b) to agree to substantial changes in the United Nations Charter in order to provide the organisa-
tion with the necessary means, organisational effectiveness and authority;
(c) to work out practical concepts for the division of labour between the United Nations and regio-
nal organisations in peace-keeping and crisis-management;
(vii) Concerned, however, that the growing difficulties of the United Nations to carry out its steadily-
increasing duties while lacking the necessary means and organisational professionalism might prompt cer-
tain leading member countries, particularly the United States, to question the usefulness of the United
Nations as an instrument for maintaining peace;
(viii) Convinced therefore that all the member countries of Westem European Union, together with asso-
ciate members, associate partners and observers, have an important responsibility in overcoming these
dangerous trends and, in close co-operation with the United States, jointly taking the necessary steps to
reform the United Nations in every possible way;
(ix) Consequently deploring that the European Union has so far failed to agree on joint action for refor-
ming the United Nations in questions of peace-keeping and crisis-management, nor has it asked WEU, on
the basis of Article J.4,paragraph 2, of the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate a comprehensive European
contribution in this matter;
(x) Deploring also that neither the WEU Noordwijk declaration nor the preliminary conclusions on the
formulation of a common European defence policy published by the WEU Council on 14th November
1994 contain a chapter on relations between WEU and the United Nations;
(xi) Expressing firmly the wish that WEU's new tasks set out in the Petersberg declaration should extend
beyond the planning stage in a foreseeable future;
(xii) Welcoming in this context the Italian proposal for the creation of a WEU multinational task force
for emergency humanitarian intert/ention;
(xfii) Recalling the persisting dangers for international peace and security stemming from:
( a) ntemanonal terrorism;
DOCUMENT 1456
(b) problems of mass migration;
(c) uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile tech-
nology;
(xiv) Wishing the positive effect of the unlimited extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to be
completed by the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the further agreed reduction of
the nuclear arsenals which still exist to be pursued;
(n) Recalling the importance of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of geno-
cide approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations and in force since 1951;
(ni) Recalling the importance of an early ratification of the chemical weapons convention and of the
197 2 biological weapons convention;
(mii) Anxious that increasing differences between NATO member countries and Russia in important
issues regarding European security might jeopardise the effectiveness of the CFE Treaty;
(xviii) Stressing the importance of making a clearer definition of the r6le of the OSCE as a regional orga-
nisation in the sense of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter,
RscovtrvENDS THAT rnr CouNcl-
1. Establish, possibly in the framework of the elaboration of a white paper on European security, a
comprehensive European contribution to reforming the United Nations Charter in peace-keeping and cri-
sis-management with the aim of allowing the Security Council to authorise action in certain situations
within countries if the human rights of people in the relevant country are so severely violated as to
require an international response on humanitarian grounds and introduce such an initiative in the United
Nations;
2. Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to sfrengthen the efficiency and operability of
United Nations forces, increase their means of action and ensure better conduct of their humanitarian and
peace-keeping missions;
3. Take steps in the United Nations to examine the possible need to strengthen the application of the
convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide approved by the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations;
4. Propose a comprehensive concept on the tasks WEU should assume in regard to operations under
the mandate of the United Nations and the OSCE;
5. Seek agreement with the OSCE and NAIO on a division of labour between the OSCE, NAIO and
WEU in peace-keeping, crisis-management and crisis-prevention;
6. For this purpose, accelerate its efforts to make WEU fully operational so as to be able to carry out
at least the missions envisaged in the Petersberg declaration including those of a WEU multilateral task
force for emergency humanitarian interventions as proposed by Italy;
7. Inform the Assembly of the tasks of combat forces in crisis-management elaborated by the Planning
Cell and the plans for setting up operational WEU sffuctures for intemational observer missions;
8. Urge all member countries, associate members, associate partners and observer countries which
have not yet ratified the chemical weapons convention and the L972 biological weapons convention, to
accelerate the ratification process;
9. Ask France and the United Kingdom to take an initiative among nuclear weapon states to agree on
the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to consider, together with all nuclear
weapon states, further substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals, priority being given to those countries
which possess the largest nuclear arsenals, and further ensure that, in the export of nuclear technology,
care is taken not to allow the emergence of new nuclear weapon states;
10. Agree on a joint initiative in regard to the September 1995 review conference of the 1980 United
Nations Conference on excessively dangerous conventional weapons in order to adopt rules limiting the
development of certain such weapons including non-lethal and anti-personnel laser weapons;
11. Maintain a dialogue with the Maghreb countries, Egypt and other countries of the Islamic world in
order to promote the widest possible co-operation with these countries;
12. Ensure that WEU is regularly represented, togetherwith the European Union, in consultations in the
ASEAN regional security forum.
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Explnnatory Memorandum
(submi.fred by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. As the subject of the present report is ex-
tremely vast, your Rapporteur is aware, as he
stressed at the committee meeting on
2TthMarch 1995, of the dfficulty of concentra-
ting on the essential problems in which European
countries in particular have to assume responsibi-
lify. It is true that today any development of a
conflict situation, in whatever area of the world it
should arise, cannot be without possible repercus-
sions on European security interests. It will there-
fore be necessary to analyse regularly the situa-
tion on a world scale. Of course, it cannot be the
purpose of this report to advocate that WEU
should assume the leading r6le in settling all pos-
sible conflicts throughout the world. But it should
shoulder its appropriate share of responsibility in
helping to promote peace, stability and security in
accordance with its means and treaty obligations.
2. Even if it is only a repetition of longstand-
ing facts, it is useful to remember that the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty imposes on its signatory
countries certain fundamental and far-reaching
obligations for the preservation of an international
peace and security order based on their resolution
expressed in the preamble:
" to reaffirm their faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity of the human
person and in the other ideals proclaimed
by the Charter of the United Nations;
to fortify and preserve the principles of
democracy, personal freedom and political
liberty, the constitutional traditions and the
rule of law, which are theircommon heritage;
to afford assistance to each other, in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United
Nations, in maintaining intemational peace
and security and in resisting any policy of
aggression... "
3. The Council of Western European Union
was created " for the purpose of strengthening
peace and security " ... and at the request ofany of
the member countries 'o shall be immediately
convened in order to permit them to consult with
regard to any situation which may constitute a
threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should
arise ...'o Moreover, as they are all full members
of the European Union, WEU member countries,
when signing and ratifying the Maastricht Treafy,
undertook to further the objectives of the Union's
common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
among them:
- 
to preserve peace and strengthen intema-
tional security, in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United
Nations as well as the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of
the Paris Charter;
- 
to promote intemational co-operation, and
- 
to develop and consolidate democracy
and the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms
(Article J.1, of the Maastricht Treaty).
4. A provision of special importance is
Article J.5, paragraph 4, of the Maastricht Treaty
providing that:
" Member states which are also members
of the United Nations Security Council,
will concert and keep the other member
states fully informed. Member states,
which are pennanent members of the Secu-
rity Council will, in the execution of their
functions, ensure the defence of the posi-
tions and the interests of the Union " but
" without prejudice to their responsibilities
under the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations."
5. However, six years after the dismantling of
the Berlin wall and the end of the east-west
confrontation, and on the eve of the celebration of
the fiftieth anniversary of the signature and the
entering in force of the Charter of the United
Nations, the only existing universal organisation in
the world aimed at preserving intemational peace
and security, we have to realise that the grcat hopes
that all the ideals proclaimed in its charter could
now be implemented in a true world order of peace,
security and liberty, are far from having been trans-
lated into reality. On the contrary, increasing parts
of the world are faced with the danger of growing
disorder amidst increasing number of regional
conflicts or tensions, from which only a few conti-
nents and world areas are spared.
II. The new challenges for internalional peace
and security
6. Only a few hours away from major Euro-
pean capitals a terrible war has been raging on the
territory of former Yugoslavia for almost five
4
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years and the intemational communify is able nei
ther to find the proper means to terminate it nor
even to agree on the nature of that conflict, nor
can it decide whether it is a civil war or a conflict
between foreign countries in which aggressors
and victims can clearly be distinguished.
7. The political situation on the territory of the
Commonwealth of Independent States is still
uncertain bearing in mind the many regional
conflicts as yet unresolved, particularly in the
Caucasus and in the Russian Federation itself; the
international community has no choice but to wit-
ness a violent so-called " intrastate " conflict in
Chechnya, officially regarded as an internal mat-
ter for Russia in which the international commu-
nity has no right to intervene. However, Russia
and all the other participants of the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
have just agreed at a summit meeting in Budapest
on a code of conduct according to which:
" Each participating state will ensure that
any decision to assign its armed forces to
internal security missions is arrived at in
conformity with constitutional procedures.
Such decisions will prescribe the armed
forces' missions, ensuring that they will be
performed under the effective control of
constitutionally established authorities and
subject to the rule of law. If recourse to
force cannot be avoided in performing
internal security missions, each participa-
ting state will ensure that its use must be
commensurate with the needs for enforce-
ment. The armed forces will take due care
to avoid injury to civilians or their property.
The participating states will not use armed
forces to limit the peaceful and lawful exer-
cise of their human and civil rights by per-
sons as individuals or as representatives of
groups nor to deprive them of their natio-
nal, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic
identity. "
8. The majority of observers agree that this
code of conduct has not been respected by the
Russian authorities in re-establishing state control
over the region of Chechnya which is seeking to
gain its independence from Russia. The weakness
of the code of conduct is clearly revealed by the
agreement reached in Budapest that it is only poli-
tically binding and not even eligible for legisla-
tion under Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
9. Finally, it was possible to install an OSCE
observer mission in Chechnya which, however,
has enormous difficulties in fulfilling its tasks
while the fighting continues. But this conflict and
growing differences between Russia and member
countries of the Atlantic Alliance might also have
repercussions on the CFE Treaty if Russia decides
to deploy in the northem Caucasus a new anny
which would constitute a breach of the above-
mentioned treaty obligations subscribed to by the
former Soviet Union, since these obligations com-
mit Russia as successor country of the Soviet
Union.
10. At the same time, a growing number of
regional tensions and conflicts are to be observed
in other world regionso as in Africa, Asia, South
America, the Middle East and in particular in the
southern region of the Mediterranean area where
religious fundamentalism is turning towards
growing political aggression and violence thus
destabilising a number of countries in those areas.
11. It is therefore of tremendous importance for
the WEU Council, with the help of its Mediterra-
nean working group, but also with that of the
WEU lnstitute for Security Studies, to continue to
maintain regular contacts and exchanges of views
with the Maghreb countries, Egypt and, in parti-
cular, Algeria. The organisation by the Dutch pre-
sidency of a seminar on " North Africa Challenge
and Response", held in The Hague on 5th Decem-
ber 1994, was in fact a good opportunity for fur-
ther reflection but it should be ensured that such
events allow a real dialogue with experts and
representatives of the relevant southem Mediter-
ranean countries.
12. Because of the importance of this dialogue
which can contribute significantly to improving
understanding of the problems these countries are
facing, the WEU Council should not be over-
anxious to limit this dialogue to politico-military
and defence questions so as not duplicate work
with the authorities of the European Union or the
OSCE. If these countries seek a broader dialogue,
no channel should be neglected and the modified
Brussels Treaty offers WEU representatives a par-
ticularly wide spectrum of competences. The
Council of WEU should also examine very care-
fully the debates and results of the Islamic confe-
rence held in Khartoum at the beginning of April
and the consequences to be drawn for developing
a wider dialogue.
13. [n several fiouble spots, notably in Soma-
lia, Rwanda and Bosnia, inability to settle regio-
nal conflicts with the ways and means so far prac-
tised by the United Nations has multiplied calls
for fundamental reform of the working methods
of the United Nations in crisis-management and
peace-keeping including the reform of its charter
and the working of its Security Council. Focal
points in Asia are Afghanistan and Cambodia; in
Africa (apart from Somalia) trouble spots have to
be settled in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique and
Rwanda; in South America, El Salvador, Guate-
mala and Haiti are on the problem list of the Uni-
ted Nations and recently even, a violent border
conflict almost led to warfare in the traditional
sense between Peru and Ecuador. The reasons for
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the many intemal conflicts cannot always be redu-
ced to one and the same corrmon denominator.
Sometimes they are caused by radical ethnic ten-
sions, sometimes by ideological differences,
sometimes by fanatical exploitation of the popula-
tion (for instance in Haiti) or sometimes simply
by power struggles between hostile clan groups
(as in Somalia). Only the consequences of the dif-
ferent conflicts have something in common: the
populations are affected by these conflicts and
deprived of their fundamental living conditions
mainly through the destruction of the infrastruc-
ture of the relevant countries'. The release of
mass flows of refugees is only one of the conse-
quences of these conflicts.
14. Problems of international mass migration
caused by the rapid increase of the world popula-
tion and the rising number of regions of political
instability and famine are demonstrated by the
fact that the global number of refugees has clim-
bed from 2.5 million n 1970 to over 23 million
today. The number of displaced persons within
countries is even larger: approximately 26 million
n 1994 and still rising. No fewer than 71 coun-
tries are currently producing or hosting signfficant
numbers of refugees 2.
15. Returning to the problems in Africa, one
should note the fact that many countries south of
the Sahara have an average defence expenditure
of about 4.5 Vo of their gross national product; for
Angola the figure is more than3Z Vo,for Mozam-
bique it is more than 9.8 Vo and for Ethiopia it is
more than 7.4 %o. The danger of this continent
remaining a conflict centre will remain as long as
fighting continues between the various guerrilla
movements and the established r6gimes in so
many countries.
16. In the East, the long-standing conflict bet-
ween India and Pakistan over Kashmir is still a
source of dangerous tension in the region even
though both sides have affirmed their
commitment to respect a ceasefire and to seek a
peaceful resolution of the conflict. The matter is
dangerous because both countries have nuclear
technology and plentiful arms supplies.
17. Regarding the Asian-Pacific region, the
establishment of a new govemment in Cambodia,
where the United Nations mandate was completed
successfully, has changed the security situation in
the Asian region in a positive manner. In
Jaly 1994, a regional forum for consultations in
security matters was created between the ASEAN
member countries (Association of South-East
Asian Nations) of which Australia, China, Japan,
l. c.f. Christian Tomuschat, Europa Archiv, No.24,24th
December 199 4, page 67 8.
2. Study of the Intemational Crisis Group, February 1995,
Camegie Endowment for Intemational Peace, Washington.
Canada, South Korea, Laos, New Zealand, Papua-
New Guinea, Russia, the United States and the
European Union are members. One of the objec-
tives of this consultative forum is to remove any
remaining conflict potential in Southem Asia 
- 
in
particular territorial disputes on the Spratly
lslands in the South China Sea or the question of
Taiwan and Hong-Kong. It might also be an
appropriate forum to make a contribution to a just,
comprehensive and internationally-acceptable
solution to the question of East Timor, a question
in which the United Nations has been involved for
a long time.
18. In this context, Japan's policy of defen-
ding its interests in the Asia-Pacific area conti-
nues to be based firmly on its close relationship
with the United States despite outstanding econo-
mic disputes and difficulties between the two
countries. With the election of the democrat,
Bill Clinton, as President of the United States,
American policy has shown increasing interest in
developing its relationship with Asia. Consulta-
tions have therefore been strengthened in the fra-
mework of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-
operation) the membership of which includes six
ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei,
as well as Australia, Japan, Canada, South Korea,
New Zealand, the United States of America, the
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong-Kong,
Mexico and Papua-New Guinea. In order to
enhance the importance of this forum which seeks
to liberalise the multinational economic system
in the region, several meetings at the level of
heads of state and of govemment have been orga-
nised.
19. Furthermore, the creation of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFIA) bet-
ween the United States, Canada and Mexico
started on lst January 1994 has established the
second largest free trade area after that created by
the European Union. It is to be hoped that the
functioning of the abovementioned regional
forums and organisations, in which countries
with sometimes very opposite interests are repre-
sented, might also contribute to stability and
security in those areas, thus avoiding the need to
introduce peace-keeping and crisis-manage-
ment means under the authority of the United
Nations.
20. A great open question however remains:
what kind of r6le will North Korea play in the
future? This question concems notably the future
attitude of this country regarding the control of its
nuclear programme, as well as whether North
Korea, a signatory of the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion treaty, will continue to be a party to this trea-
ty. After the joint statement by North Korea and
the United States on 13th August 1994, orre may
hope that North Korea's indication that it was pre-
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pared to remain a party to the nuclear non-prolife-
ration treaty and would allow implementation of
the safeguards agreement under the treaty, will
foster the normalisation of the country with other
countries in the region.
21. In the area of worldwide arms control,
disarmament and non-proliferation of conventio-
nal and non-conventional armaments, the pro-
blems of smuggling and clandestine arms transfer,
especially of ABC weapons is becoming increa-
singly threatening. Of course, it is most welcome
that the worldwide conference held in New York
from 17th April to 12th May 1995 led to the deci-
sion reached by consensus among the more than
175 participating countries to extend the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty for an indefinite period.
However, a few days earlier, North Korea
announced that it would leave the conference.
There is also uncertainty about the prospects of
the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty
and a global ban on the production of fissile mate-
rial for building nuclear weapons. The process of
ratification of the chemical weapons convention
is also progressing quite slowly. By the end of
March 1995, only 27 of 159 signatory countries
have ratified the convention3. An increasing num-
ber of countries which refuse to participate in the
international missile technology control r6gime
(MTCR) are developing ballistic and cruise miss-
ile technology, thus increasing the risk of uncon-
trolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Furthernore, the Open Skies Treaty has still
not come into force.
22. During the Political Committee's recent
visit to Canada and the United States, it was parti-
cularly interesting to hear Canadian govemmental
representatives and also members of parliament
presenting a definition of " security " which goes
beyond the basic mititary orpolitico/miliry arca.
Intemational population gtowth, mass immigra-
tion (already mentioned above), international
crime, narcotic trafficking and also environmental
dangers resulting from changes in climate are
considered as security threats in a very broad
sense in Canada.
23. Another area of increasing danger stems
from the individual terrorist groups and also so-
called " renegate " countries in using terrorism as
part of their political activities to make use of the
knowledge of international scientists (for instance
from the former Soviet Union who have lost their
jobs) to build up weaponry of mass destruction.
This was one of the reasons for establishing the
lnternational Science and Technology centre in
Moscow to help those scientists find new fields of
application for their talents and abilities.
3. Information given by the French Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.
III. Necessily and limits of refonning
the international system of crtsis-prevention
and crisis-management
(q rne united Naians
24. It is not your Rapporteur's intention to
renew the debate on the still conffoversial question
of whether the idea of creating a universal order of
peace and security is based on an illusion. Of cour-
se, the time has not yet come for a world govem-
ment, but the development of a global order not as
an end in itself, but as a means of protection
against universal dangers and as a possibility for
reaching common goals, must be recognised as a
necessity. The first step in this direction was the
creation of the United Nations which of course has
no power of its own but which has proved its use-
fulness. Its efficiency can be considerably impro-
ved if all member states show the political will to
use it still more as the main instrument for ensu-
ring intemational peace and security as proposed
in Article I of the United Nations Charter.
25. However, any thought of reforming the
United Nations as principal guarantor of interna-
tional peace and securiry has to take account of
the fact that the United Nations as it was 50 years
ago is not at all the same today. When it was crea-
ted, there were 51 founder-members who all had
the impression that they had just experienced the
most disastrous world war in history. Today, the
United Nations has 184 member countries. Only a
small minority, which could be described as those
belonging to the OECD, constitute a group of
highly industrialised countries in which the eco-
nomy is prosperous, human rights and social wel-
fare are generally respected and politics are based
on democratic structures and principles. The secu-
rity of most North West hemisphere countries is
guaranteed by military alliances such as NATO
and by increasing political integration of the
European Union type. The creation of a stronger
OSCE helps to bring the various parts of the for-
mer Soviet empire closer to a pan-European and
transatlantic collective security system.
26. The great majority of today's United
Nations member countries however are not
among this privileged group of states. Only a very
small percentage of the world population lives in
member countries of the OECD. A great majority
of United Nations member countries, in particular
in Africa and Asia, still have an anarchical system
based on a security perception which is based
mainly on their own military power as the only
instrument for guaranteeing peace and order in the
country and the security of territorial borders. For
them, national sovereignty is a cornerstone of
their existence.
27 . It is one of the difficult tasks of the United
Nations to reduce the system of anarchy by an
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international order ofpeace and security based on
co-operative security and economic and social
welfare. Other means might be to increase efforts
to introduce democracy among less privileged
countries without imposing on them systems
which do not correspond to their respective ffadi-
tions and sometimes different ways of life and
thinking. The idea of establishing a world order
can be convincing for the majority of less privile-
ged countries only if there is no risk of them being
given the impression that this enterprise might
lead to a hegemonial system led by a small club of
highly developed countries creating a sort of neo-
colonialism. On the other hand, the United
Nations must not be allowed to develop into an
assembly where an overwhelming majority of so-
called third world countries can block any sub-
stantial progress with the result that moie and
more great powers 
- 
which are also the largest
financial contributors to the organisation 
- 
lose
interest in the United Nations.
28. There is no lack of ideas and proposals
regarding the necessary reform of the United
Nations in order to adapt its charter and its capa-
bilities to the new challenges. One of the prin-
ciples on which the Charter of the United Nations
is legally based is that of " the sovereign equality
of all its members " (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the
Charter). Paragraph 7 of the same article states:
" Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorise the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present
Charter. "
The only exception is that " this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement mea-
sures under Chapter VII. " This chapter gives the
Security Council the right to determine whether
there exists " any threat to peace, break of the
peace, or act of aggression " and gives it the
authority to decide on measures to handle the mat-
ter without involving the use of armed forces or to
take such action by military force as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. (Article 42 of the Charter).
29. But according to a report issued by the Uni-
ted Nations Secretary-General on 3rd January
1995 on the occasion of the ffiieth anniversary of
the United Nationso, of twenty-one peace-keeping
operations established since 1988, only eight have
related to inter-state wars, whereas thirteen
(62 Vo) have related to intra-state conflicts. Of the
eleven operations established since January 1992
all but two (82 Vo) relate to intra-state conflicts.
30. In reality, it has so far been rarely possible
to reach agreement in the Security Council about
whether an " internal conflict " in whatever world
region is to be considered a threat to intemational
peace or an act of aggression, allowing the United
Nations to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction
of a member state. There are therefore growing
calls to amend the Charter to this effect. This is
not the only area where amendments have been
proposed however. At the end of Septem-
ber 1994s Gerard Fuchs, Secretary ofthe French
Socialist Party launched the following five propo-
sals:
" First, it is necessary to inffoduce into the
charter the notion of democratic and huma-
nitarian intervention... famine and genoci-
de, non-respect of the rights of minorities,
for example, seem to be widely accepted as
unquestionable grounds for intervention. "
Similar considerations have been introduced in
other frameworks, for instance in the progress
report by the Political-Military steering commit-
teelad hoc group on co-operation in peace-kee-
ping of the NACC on 2nd December 19946,
announcing the examination for spring 1995 of
the legal basis for presence and action under
Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, limilations on national sovereignty...
" Moreover, in a report of the 'Commission
on Global Governance', established in
1992 at the instigation of former German
Chancellor Willy Brandt, presented in
Davos by Mr. lngmar Carlsson at the end of
February t9951, an amendment of the
Charter of the United Nations was propo-
sed permitting international action in cases
which, in the judgment of the Security
Council, constitute such a gross violation
of the security of people that an internatio-
nal response is required on humanitarian
grounds. "
Of course it will be most dfficult to agree on such
an amendment calling into question one of the
foundations of the Charter, which will be defended
by various countries and not only these belonging
to the so-called third world. But it is worth taking
an appropriate initiative in order to ffansfer at least
part of state sovereignty to the United Nations
without lapsing into a sort of neo-colonialism. The
second proposal suggests that:
" the United Nations must devolve certain
responsibilities to regional organisations
that exist or are to be created. Fire-fighting
is all right, fire-prevention is better and
neighbours are the best placed for that. "
5. Le Monde, 28th September 1994.
6. Atlantic News, No. 2677 151 
"*1,6th 
December 1994.
7. Intemational Herald Tribune,25th January 1995.4. Document N5O!6O Sll995ll.
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31. This last argument which was also put for-
ward by a representative of the Canadian foreign
affairs ministry during the committee's recent
visit to this country merits more careful examina-
tion to which your rapporteur will revert subse-
quently.
" Third, it is necessary to strengthen the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the Secur-
ity Council for its decisions to be better
applied and less suspect. Germany and
Japan have a place as new permanent mem-
bers. Other states should be added: a Latin-
American, an African, an Asian and an
Arab. "
32. It is obvious that in opening the question of
enlarging the United Nations Security Council
one enters into such dfficult problems that it will
be unrealistic to expect early agreements or solu-
tions. The so-called " Open-ended working group
on the question of equitable representation on the
increase of the membership of the Security Coun-
cil " has not yet been able to submit a recommen-
dation to harmonise proposals emanating from
almost a hundred dffierent United Nations mem-
ber countries. It might therefore be more mea-
ningful to concentrate on the problem of how to
improve the efficiency of the Security Council
even though this question cannot be totally sepa-
rated from that of its composition. The possible
representation of the European Union as an orga-
nisation in the Securiry Council (project which
has apparently been abandoned in the meantime)
again demonstrates the importance of the question
of whether the charter should continue to rely
exclusively on the sovereignty of nation states.
33. In this context it was very interesting to
hear the position defended by a representative of
the Canadian foreign office during the Political
Committee's recent visit to Offawa. Canada has
opted for more transparency and openness in the
deliberations of the Security Council, so that
countries which might be asked to send peace-
keeping troops in a given world region as a result
of a decision taken by the Security Council could
have the opportunity to be consulted before deci-
sions are made.
" Fourth, the United Nations should be
given permanent or semi-permanent mili-
tary means: just as within a state there is nojustice without police, resolutions of the
United Nations must be backed by forces to
ensure, if necessary, that they are respected.
Several thousand of its own forces and, in
the member states, several thousand avai-
lable forces should be created without
delay. "
34. This subject is also one of the most difficult
and controversial chapters of intemational crisis-
management. The possibilities offered by the
Charter to establish proper United Nations forces
under a proper United Nations command sffucture
have never been implemented. The experience in
Somalia has led to a situation where the United
States is now less prepared to participate in Uni-
ted Nations peace-keeping operations unless
conducted under United States command.
Congress is even making major efforts to reduce
the powers of the United States President to enga-
ge United States froops abroad without consulting
it in accordance with the draft peace power act
which has not yet become legislation however.
Moreover, the text of the national security revita-
lisation act adopted by the House of Representa-
tives but not yet by the United States Senate pro-
vides that, with the exception of very limited
situations, the President may not place any ele-
ment of the armed forces under United Nations
command or control.
35. Nevertheless, State Departmentrepresenta-
tives demonstrated some optimism during the
Political Committee's visit to Washington in atrir-
ming that the United States would never withdraw
from participating in peace-keeping but that it was
the policy of President Clinton to review the
whole procedure in order to reduce costs and
enhance efficiency. Nevertheless, there are
grounds for concern: the United States adminis-
tration has drawn up firm criteria, one of which
being that any operation has to be in the national
interest of the United States.
36. ln a more general context, there are increa-
sing problems among member countries in
making troops and equipment available. As the
recent supplementary report of the United Nations
Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the United Nations of
3rd January 1995 clearly points out8, the availabi-
lity has considerably declined as measured
against the United Nations' requirements.
" A considerable effort has been made to
expand and refine stand-by arrangements,
but these provide no guarantee that ffoops
will be provided for a specific operation.
For example, when in May 1994 the Secur-
ity Council decided to expand the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(LTNAMIR), not one of the 19 governments
that at that time had undertaken to have
troops on stand-by agreed to contribute. "
37. The United Nations Secretary-General
concludes therefore that the United Nations does
need to give serious thought to the idea of a rapid
reaction force:
" such a force would be the Security Coun-
cil's sffategic reserve for deployment when
8. Document N50/6O/Sl995l l.
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there was an emergency need for peace-
keeping troops. It might comprise batta-
lion-sized units from a number of coun-
tries. These units would be trained to the
same standards, use the same operating
procedures, be equipped with integrated
communications equipment and take part injoint exercises at regular intervals. They
would be stationed in their home countries
but maintained at a high state of readiness.
The value of this arrangement would of
course depend on how far the Security
Council could be sure that the force would
actually be available in an emergency. This
will be a complicated and expensive arran-
gement, but I believe that the time has
come to undertake it. "
38. However, the declaration by the Chairman
of the Security Council made on 22nd Februa-
ry 1995 did not follow this proposal but asked that
the frst priority be given to improving the rapid
deployment capability by strenghening existing
stand-by agreements with member states.
39. In view of additional differences between
the United States and other United Nations mem-
ber countries involved in efforts to settle the
conflict in former Yugoslavi4 and in particular on
the respective r6les of peace-keeping units and
NATO forces in that conflict, there are poor
chances that member countries will follow the
recommendations of the United Nations Secretary-
General. As has been said by several leading defen-
ce politicians, there is on the contrary a tendency to
request that military operations authorised by the
Security Council should be executed under the
exclusive responsibility of relevant military organi-
sations such as NAIO (orperhaps WE[I);
" Fiffh, money is necessary if the Secreta-
ry-General is not to be perpetually at the
mercy of bad payers... too often the United
States. Why not feed the United Nations
budget from that low-rate tax on move-
ments of capitals proposed by serious eco-
nomists...? "
The future of the United Nations' financial pro-
blems depends in large part on the attitude of the
United States, its largest financial contributor.
Here we find a marked tendency both in Congtess
and in the United States Government, to define
the United States' commitment to United Nations
peace-keeping operations according to very strict
conditions and to reduce considerably the United
States' financial contributions :
" Republican proposals for sharp reduc-
tions in the United States funding of the
United Nations have generated uncertainty
here about the future of the traditional Uni-
ted States dominance in the world organisa-
tion. Many countries express concern about
possible American cutbacks because they
know that when the largest United Nations
donor gives less, the whole organisation
does less. Some fear that an abrupt reffeat
by Washington would relegate the United
Nations once again to the marginal r6le it
played during the cold war. "e
40. The United States Ambassador to the Uni-
ted Nations, Mrs. Albright, has therefore started a
campaign to protect the United Nations from
attacks by the Republicans, putting forward the
argument that peace-keeping operations cost only
$4 a year for each citizen t0. Moreover, a study
conducted by the Council of Foreign Relations in
New York " says that the approach of Congress is
based on:
" a palpably false factual assumption that
the United States is contributing dispropor-
tionately to the United Nations in voluntary
contributions. In fact, other countries,
including America's major allies and
friends, also voluntarily underwrite
unreimbursable expenses far in excess of
their formal United Nations assessment for
peace-keeping. "
41. In a further attempt to foster continued Uni-
ted States support for the United Nations, the Uni-
ted States permanent representative to the United
Nations in Geneva affirmed in a speech on
6th February 1995 t2, that:
" Money is only a part of the problem. The
erosion of United Nations effectiveness in
many sectors has come about because the
institution has largely escaped the reform
movement of the past twenty years which
all major institutions in industrial societies
have experienced. The lack of major reform
in the United Nations is beginning to take
its toll, much like corrosion attacks the
structure of a large vessel.
The reform of which I speak is not merely
an issue of moving boxes around in an
organisational diagram. Rather, it is crea-
ting fundamental change in basic areas like
the personnel system, the process of finan-
cial control and budgeting, the complex
govemance structures of specialised agen-
cies and the obvious presence of functional
redundancy and overlap.
Far more is involved, however, than badly
needed structural reform.
The United Nations needs to re-examine its
:l:*r4", techniques in many areas.
9. Intemational Herald Tribune, 17th March 1995.
10. L,e Monde, 12th February 1995.
11. Intemational Herald Tribune, 14th February 1995.
12. USIS, 2tst February 1995.
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The time has come for all the member
states and the United Nations secretariats to
recognise that reform must be a high priori-
ty to be pursued in both of their inierests. A
United Nations whose performance erodes
steadily from lack of reform will never
obtain the resources it needs to carry out its
functions on behalf of all nations. '
Donors are demanding far greater accoun-
tability, transparency and effectiveness in
the United Nations and our adamance is
fast overcoming the reticence of the past.
The developing countries need to join in
the fight for United Nations reform. They
need to understand that they could be the
p{ncipal beneficiaries of a vastly more
efficient United Nations. Reform of the
United Nations is not an effort of the indus-
trialised world to somehow deprive develo-
ping nations of benefits which they receive
as a result of the organisation's work.
The ground rules for peace-keeping need to
be re-examined, but peace-keeping must be
maintained.
Peace-keeping operations within states as
opposed to those between states make dif-
ferent and greater demands on peace-kee-
pers involving considerable risk for their
security as well as for mission success. In
these situations we should consider
delaying introducing forces until the parties
accept and observe for a trial period milita-
ry and political steps toward a negotiated
settlement.
We also need to look beyond traditional
peace-keeping operations to the ability of
regional organisations or to individual
member states or ad hoc coalitions for
peace-keeping functions authorised by the
Security Council.
We must broaden and deepen the dialogue
between rich and poor nations. "
42. In a further effort, the United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Albright,
underlined in a testimony to the United States
Senate's Appropriations Committee on Foreign
Operations on 8th March 199513, that United
Nations peace-keeping is a'o cost-effective means
of containing regional conflicts, promoting demo-
gracy and human rights, stemming refugees
flows, and bringing stability to regions of strate-
gic and economic importance io the United
States ".
43. The attitude of the United States towards
future support of the United Nations as the only
universal organisation devoted to maintaining
international peace and security will be an impori
tant matter in the future Euro-American dialogue.
Part of this dialogue will be a better definition and
distinction between the various means and instru-













4. It is obvious that neither in all member
countries nor in all relevant international organi-
sations will all the abovementioned notions be
used with the same meaning and significance.
Harmonisation is necessary because it has an
important impact on the efficiency of co-opera-
tion between the United Nations, r6gional organi-
sations and member countries when conducting a
specific mission in a given situation. In this
connection it seems that the United States and the
United Kingdom have already reached some
agreement on the use of certain definitions.
According to the former United States view,
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement were dis-
tinguished only by different levels of violence.
The British view, however, is that peace-keeping,
which depends on the consent of the people oTthe
country concerned, is different from " peace-
enforcement " which involves taking sid-es and
using considerable flre powerro. In Sbmalia, the
United States changed the aim from peace-
keeping to trying to destroy the warlord Moham-
med Farah Aideed and this did not work. The new
United States manual determines now that o'[Jni-
ted States policy distinguishes between peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement. Both are peace
operations. However, they are not part of a conti-
nuum allowing a unit to move freely from one
objective to the other. "
45. It seems that there is still much work to be
done to elaborate a comprehensive approach for
using the different instruments thus mentioned
and this holds true not only between member
states but also between the interested organisa-
tions. As revealed in the report of the United
Nations Secretary-General published in Septem-
11
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ber 1994 on the work of the organisationrs a mee-
ting was held in New York on 1st Augult 1994
between the United Nations Secretary-General
and heads ofregional organisations. The purpose
of this meeting was to assess co-operation bet-
ween the United Nations and regional arrange-
ments and organisations with a view to further
enhancing it in the area of peace-keeping and cri-
sis-management. Western European Union was
represented at the meeting but the second paf-o!
the fortieth annual report of the Council provided
no information in this respect. According to the
United Nations Secretary-General's report, parti-
cipants were in broad agreement that primary res:
o5nsibilitv for the maintenance of intemational
i"u." and security remains with the Security
Council.
46. At the same time, participants acknowled-
ged the desirability of decentralising certain tasks
under a United Nations mandate. It would be
important to know if another such meeting is
envisaged, when it will take place and what will
be on i1s agenda. One item which Western Euro-
pean Union should ask to be discussed at a further
meeting should be the detailed description and
definition of all the instruments of peace-keeping
and crisis-management enumerated in
paragraph 40. Furthermore, the division of labour
-between the United Nations and regional organi-
sations in the sense of Chapter VItr of the United
Nations Charter and between the United Nations
and groups of states in the sense of Chaptgr VII of
the United Nations Charter should be worked out.
This second aspect concerns mainly relations bet-
ween the United Nations and NATO and WEU.
So far certain difficulties of division of labour
became obvious only between the United Nations
and NAIO, i.e. in the case of the military opera-
tions of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(ii) The rOlc otregianal organisations
47. The necessary reform of the United Nations
in its r6le of global crisis-prevention and crisis-
management must necessarily include the ques-
tion of co-ordination with regional organisations
in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the
United Nations. tn itris connection, the future r6le
of the OSCE is of a major interest. At the last
CSCE summit meeting in Budapest on 5th and
6th December 1994, the conference was renamed
" OSCE ". It was decided that it will be " a prima-
ry instrument for early warning, conflict-preven-
tion and crisis-management " in the region cove-
red by its member states.
48. A closer link was agreed between the Uni-
ted Nations and the OSCE so that " the participa-
ting states may, in exceptional circumstances,jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the
United Nations Security Council on behalf of the
OSCE ". But a joint Dutch-German initiative, an
" OSCE first " whereby states would attempt to
exhaust the OSCE's dispute resolution possibili-
ties before tuming to the United Nations Security
Council and whereby the OSCE could give assis-
tance to participating states in carrying oul mea-
sures subsequently adopted by the United Nations
Security Council, was not adopted. As a result of
a number of other differences on ways and means
of co-operation between the OSCE and the United
Nationi, the entire chapter which called also for
an additional and regular flow of information bet-
ween the two organisations was jettisoned'u.
49. In this context, it was particularly interes-
ting to hear the assessment made_ by
tr,tr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Director-General of the
International Security Bureau of the Canadian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs during the Political
Committee's visit to Ottawa. He strongly recom-
mended that regional organisations should play a
major r61e in conflict-prevention and crisis-mana-
gement because they are closer to and more fami-
liar with the problems on the spot. This is an
important argument, but one could also question
the impartiality of regional organisations in that
neighbburing Countries mightbe more involved in
a conflict.
50. One could also examine more closely how
useful the Organisation of American States (OAS)
was in settling the most recent border dispute bet-
ween Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Lysyshyn introduced
a new element into the discussion in affirming
that established and structured intemational orga-
nisations were not always able to settle a dispute.
He believed therefore in the usefulness of creating
ad hoc grcups such as the contact group regardlng
formeiYugoslavia. These groups had major
advantages even if smaller countries were not
very enthusiastic about this kind of conflict-settle-
ment, but contact groups could have variable
membership. Mr. Lysyshyn also advocated a
contact grolp approach for settling the dispute
between Peru and Ecuador.
51. These ideas must necessarily be of interest
to European institutions such as the European
Union and Western European Union whose
efforts are concentrated on elaborating a joint
foreign, security and defence policy on a more
stnrctured basis. Regarding the OSCE, Mr. Lysy-
shyn sees its usefulness mainly in two r€spects:
fiist in its conflict-prevention function and
observer mission, in particular the OSCE's action
in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
through the mediation of the OSCE Minsk group,
16. North Atlantic Assembly StaffReport on the CSCE Buda-
pest sunmit meeting, 1994, Document N-282PC (94)9.15. Document N49ll,2nd September 1994.
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in Georgia and Moldova; second, in the fact that
Russia has a full voice in the OSCE process, thus
avoiding being excluded from participating in an
important way in the process of establishing a
stable European security architecture.
52. But one should not conceal that the OSCE
mission finally authorised in Chechnya was to no
avail. The code of conduct on politico-military
aspects of security adopted in Budapest was not
respected by Russia in Chechnya, the Budapest
summit meeting was unable to agree on any state-
ment about the conflict in former Yugoslavia and
co-operation between the OSCE and the United
Nations remained unclear, as was that with other
organisations, in particular the European Union,
Westem European Union and NATO.
53. The latter's Secretary-General, at a meeting
with the United Nations and regional and other
organisations at the occasion of the OSCE summit
meeting in Budapest, recalled that " the alliance
remains ready to support peace-keeping and other
operations, based on United Nations or OSCE
mandate, but effectiveness requires efficient inter-
action and co-ordination both at the political-stra-
tegic level and at the tactical level ". Moreover,
co-ordination between the OSCE function in
conflict-prevention and the activities of the allian-
ce to enhance its r6le in the same area through the
NACC and PFP process has still to be elaborated
more clearly.
54. Unfornrnately, the chapter devoted to rela-
tions between WEU and the CSCE in the prelimi-
nary conclusions on the formulation of a common
defence policy published by the WEU Council is
very short, reaffirming WEU's resolution to sup-
port the CSCE with its own resources and to
continue working with the CSCE (now OSCE),
but there is no concrete information regarding
ways and means. The Assembly has only second-
hand information about the fact that the Secretary-
General of WEU made a written contribution to
the Budapest summit meeting of the CSCE held
on 5th and 6th December 1994, according to
which points of contact have been established bet-
ween the Secretariat and the Planning Cell and
OSCE bodies. It is most regrettable that the text of
this contribution was never transmitted to the
Assembly.
MThe r6le of Europe
(i1 The European lJnion
55. According to Article J.3 of the Maastricht
Treaty, the European Union has the possibility to
define a specific area for a joint action in the fra-
mework of its common foreign and security poli-
cy. Within the so far defined six areas for whichjoint actions have been decided, the question of
reforming the efficiency of the United Nations,
including its Security Council, has not been inclu-
ded. Whereas the presidency conclusion of the
European Council's summit meeting dated
1lth December 1994 makes no particular referen-
ce to this question, the Union addressed a lengthy
memorandum to the 49th General Assembly of
the United Nations, in which it stresses the need
for appropriate co-ordination between the United
Nations and regional organisations within the fra-
mework of the Charter of the United Nations.
With reference to the fiftieth anniversary of the
United Nations, no mention is made of eventually
reforming this organisation and in which way, but
the European Union:
" is conscious that the severe financial cri-
sis facing the United Nations has profound
implications for the organisation as a whole
and especially for the effective execution of
its peace-keeping task, since some two
thirds of the substantial contributions due
to the United Nations are owed in this res-
pect. As the financial crisis is due to a lack
of payment discipline on the part of a large
number of United Nations member states,
the European Union calls upon those mem-
ber states to duly fulfil their financial obli-
gations to the United Nations. "
56. Conversely, the European Union made an
important contribution to the General Assembly
of the United Nations on all questions of disarma-
ment, arms control and non-proliferation, in the
framework of which it considers the non-prolife-
ration treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the glo-
bal nuclear non-proliferation system. The Euro-
pean Union has therefore, in the framework of its
common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
adopted joint action on thepreparation of the NPT
review conference held in New York from
17th April to l2th May 1995.
" The Union is convinced that the streng-
thening of the global nuclear non-prolifera-
tion r6gime can only be achieved through
indefinite and unconditional extension of,
as well as universal accession to, the treaty.
Furthermore, this extension is the basis for
the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
The European Union therefore welcomes
the accessions to the NPT which have
recently taken place and we appeal to those
states still outside the NPT to accede to it as
non-nuclear weapon states and to conclude
safeguards agreements with the Internatio-
nal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
As important supplier countries of nuclear
technology and members of the Nuclear
13
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Suppliers Group (NSG), the European
Union calls on the other supplier countries
to apply the IAEA full scale safeguards
requirements as a condition for supply and
urges all countries concemed to implement
such full scale safeguard agreements.
The European Union is in favour of a com-
plete, universal and internationally veri-
fiable test ban treaty. In this respect, it wel-
comes the substantial progress made in the
Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT).
The European Union would also welcome
the initiation of negotiations on a universal,
non-discriminatory and effectively veri-
fiable treaty banning the production of fis-
sile material for nuclear explosive devices(cut-off) in accordance with the General
Assembly Resolution 48f7 5 L. "
On the other hand, the member countries of the
European Union which are nuclear powers seem
not to be very keen on initiating reductions in
their own nuclear arsenals and the Union's above-
mentioned memorandum refers merely to the
importance of implementing existing nuclear
disarmament agreements.
57. Conversely, according to the Union, the
convention on the prohibition of chemical wea-
pons (CWC) is one of the most significant and
innovative agreements on disarmament and arms
control.
" The European Union calls upon all states
which have not yet done so to accede to the
1972 convention on the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxin wea-
pons and on their destruction, known as
BTWC. The Union supports the strengthe-
ning of the BTWC by the addition of an
effective verification r6gime. The Euro-
pean Union notes the work of the special
conference of states parties to the 1972
convention on the prohibition of the (biolo-
gical) and toxin weapons and on their des-
truction, currently meeting in Geneva. The
European Union hopes the special confe-
rence will establish a drafting group with a
mandate to develop a legally binding verifi-
cation protocol. The Union attaches great
importance to the effective verification of
the convention. The European Union also
calls upon all states which have not yet
done so to accede to the convention. "
In fact, by the end of March 1995, only 27 cowr-
tries had ratified the ffeaty. 65 rutlfrcations are
necessary before the organisation responsible for
the prohibition of chemical weapons can start
work. In Europe so far Bulgaria, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Norway, Romania, Spain and
Sweden have ratified the treaty. It is of course of
particular importance that all WEU member
countries accelerate their ratification process.
58. Whereas nothing can be found in the
memorandum on the question of counter-prolife-
ration measures regarding the spread of ballistic
and cruise missile capabilities in several world
regions, there is an important paragraph on the
question of dealing with dual-use goods, an area
in which the European Union expects soon to
develop uniform legislation for the export control
of dual-use items.
" An essential component of an effective
monitoring system willbe common lists of
dual-use goods, intended destinations and
guidelines for authorisation decisions. "
The Union even made an announcement that deci-
sions on the content of these lists will be the sub-
ject of further joint action within the meaning of
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union. It
would be interesting to know how these initiatives
will fit in with present thoughts in the United
States about creating a replacement for the Cocom
r6gime which was abandoned at the end of the
cold war. According to information gathered
during the committee's visit to Washington, a new
r6gime should be based on consensus between the
parties and should include Russia as a founder
member.
(ii) Western European Union
59. Reading the memorandum transmitted by
the European Union to the 49th General Assembly
of the United Nations, one should ask whether and
to what extent WEU has made a contribution to this
paper which tackles a number of questions for
which WEU has special responsibility. However,
apart from some minor references to WEU in the
context of the description of WEU's monitoring
activities regarding the implementation of the
Danube and Adriatic sanctions and regarding WEU
police forces as paft of the European Union admi-
nistration of the town of Mostar, only a general
remark about closer links between the European
Union and WEU is to be found in this document.
60. Three observations are called for in this
context: frst, all questions of nuclear non-prolife-
ration and all questions regarding global disarma-
ment and arms control seem to be treated exclusi-
vely by the European Union although their
implications for European defence are more than
evident. It is therefore logical that, according to
the Noordwijk conclusions on a common Euro-
pean defence policy, it is within the responsibility
of WEU governments to deal with questions of
proliferation, disarmament and the destruction of
nuclear and chemical weapons.
t4
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61. One may therefore wonder why the Euro-
pean Union has so far failed to ask Western Euro-
pean Union, in application of Article J.4, paru-
graph2, of the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate and
implement actions of the Union with regard to
weapons proliferation and disarmament. Second,
one may also wonder why the Union has not yet
made any request for a Western European Union
contribution for reforming the existing United
Nations system of peace-keeping and crisis-
management. Thfud, one has to wonder why the
Council of Westem European Union has not taken
such an initiative of its own accord on the basis of
its obligation stemming from the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, in approaching both the United
Nations and the OSCE.
62. However, the Assembly had recommended
establishing direct co-ordination with the United
Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent
WEU representation in these two organisations
(Recommendation 559). In is reply to Recommen-
dation 559, the Council specified that the mission to
the United Nations and to the CSCE of the country
holding the WEU presidency acts as a contact point
for these organisations, and is responsible for pre-
senting WEU's contribution to the competent United
Nations or CSCE bodies. The Assembly had also
recommended making " its views known in a more
convincing and visible manner in the United Nations
and arrange for WEU to speak with one voice in the
Security Council of thatorganisafion " @ecommen-
dation 565 on a European security policy). But the
reply of the Council referred simply to the text of
Articles J.l and J.5 of the Treaty on European
Union, without mentioning any of the commifinents
the WEU Council has entered into vis-i-vis the Uni-
ted Nations anilor the CSCE following its Peters-
berg declaration.
63. It therefore seems necessary to recall these
new commitments. In the Petersberg declara-
tionrT, WEU ministers agreed:
" As WEU develops its operational capabi-
lities in accordance with the Maastricht
declaration, we are prepared to support, on
a case-by-case basis and in accordance with
our own procedures, the effective imple-
mentation of conflict-prevention and crisis-
management measures, including peace-
keeping activities of the CSCE or the
United Nations Security Council. This will
be done without prejudice to possible
contributions by other CSCE countries and
other organisations to these activities.
WEU member states declare that they are
prepared to make available military units
from the whole spectrum of their conven-
tional armed forces for military tasks
conducted under the authority of WEU.
Decisions to use military units answerable
to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council
in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations. Participation
in specific operations will remain a soverei-
gn decision of member states in accordance
with national constitutions.
Apart from contributing to the common
defence in accordance with Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty and Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
- 




tasks of combat forces in crisis-manage-
ment, including peace-making. "
64. In the frst part of the fortieth annual report
of the Council to the Assembly'8, the Council
informs the Assembly that " as regards the new
operational missions defined in the Petersberg
declaration, a basic document on peace-keeping
operations has been presented to ministers, who
have taken note ". No further information is given
on the content or the conclusions to be drawn
from this document which has not been transmit-
ted to the Assembly. However, in its preliminary
conclusions on the formulation of a common
European defence policy the Council affirms that:
" Some important results have already been
achieved on the organisation and functio-
ning of WEU in times of crisis, on WEU
humanitarian missions and on WEU's r6le
in peace-keeping. The preliminary list of
forces answerable to WEU (FAWELI) pro-
vides an indication of units available for
WEU operations. "
65. But the Noordwijk declaration contains no
specific chapter on relations bet'ween WEU and the
United Nations. Nevertheless it recognises that:
" Recent events have underlined the impor-
tance of WEU to be able to play a more
significant and effective r61e in facing
humanitarian emergencies caused by inter-
national crises or natural catastrophes.
Taking account of the leading r6le of the
European Union as a major body for co-
ordination of European humanitarian assis-
tance, ministers sfress that it is one of the
r6le of WEU to provide for a European ins-
trument of reaction in cases where, due to
the urgency of a humanitarian crisis or the
17. Document 1322,zgthJune 1992.
15
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need for military protection, military means
must be employed. Consequently, WEU has
to be able to count on immediately available
capabilities and arangements which allow a
rapid response to such emergencies. Minis-
ters endorse the report regarding the setting-
up of the arrangements and the provision of
the means for a humanitarian task force and
mandate the Permanent Council speedily to
implement this initiative.
Ministers took note of the initial report,
approved by the Permanent Council, on
WEU's r6le in evacuation operations.
Ministers request the Permanent Council to
continue work on this subject in close co-
ordination with the relevant European
Union bodies. "
Moreover,
" WEU governments are ready to take on
their share of the responsibility for the pro-
motion of security, stability and the values
of democracy in the wider world, including
through the execution ofpeace-keeping and
other crisis-management measures under
the authority of the United Nations Securi-
ty Council or the CSCE, acting either inde-
pendently or through WEU or NAIO. They
are also ready to address new security chal-
lenges such as humanitarian emergencies;
proliferation; terrorism; international crime
and environmental risks, including those
related to disarmament and the destruction
of nuclear and chemical weapons. "
66. In the Noordwijk declaration, ministers
reaffirmed their will to set up an independent
European satellite system and recognised the need
to complement WEU capacities in the area of
intelligence and crisis-management in order to
fuLfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg decla-
ration: for instance a situation cenffe and an intel-
ligence section; moreover, combined civilian and
military activities in the framework of Petersberg
missions are under consideration. Nothing regar-
ding these activities has yet been made known to
the United Nations either directly or through
European Union channels with the result that
WEU still plays only a marginalised r6le in
contributing to strengthening worldwide stability
and security.
67. The activities initiated by the Planning Cell
such as studies on the possible deployment of
WEU maritime forces in response torequirements
in order to accomplish specific Petersberg mis-
sions, studies on WEU's strategic mobility, WEU
involvement in peace-keeping missions, WEU
humanitarian missions, WEU generic evacuation
planning etc. have not yet reached a stage at
which firm proposals can be made for WEU
contributions to worldwide crisis-management.
68. It is now time, however, to accelerate the
decision-making process so that WEU finally
becomes operational in crisis-management.
According to the second part of the fortieth annual
report of the Council, " events n 1994 and diffi-
culties faced by the United Nations system and
non-governmental organisations prompted public
opinion to demand concrete action ". But when
will WEU be ready to offer this kind of action?
When will it be possible to implement the ltalian
proposal to create a multinational task force for
humanitarian operations?
69. When will the studies defining the missions
of WEU combat forces in crisis-management
including peace-keeping be carried into effect and
when will the studies for the formation of WEU
observers be completed and what will their task
be? As long as WEU remains at the stage of
theoretical study it will continue to be marginali-
sed in the world where policy is carried into prac-
tice.
70. A particular example of the marginalisation
of WEU's r6le is the case of Rwanda. The above-
mentioned memorandum of the European Union
to the United Nations General Assembly contains
an impofiant chapter on Rwanda in which WEU is
not mentioned at all. The flrst part of the fortieth
annual report however afErms that:
" A number of member states confirmed
their readiness to conffibute to the initiative
to alleviate the terrible sufferings in Rwan-
da, subject to a new decision from the
United Nations Security Council, taking
into account the time needed to gather the
necessary resources for the effec-
tive deployment of the expanded UNA-
MIR II.
In this context, the Council has decided to
give WEU's support to the efforts of its
member states by co-ordinating their
contributions.
To this end, the Council confirmed the
mandate given at its first meeting to the
Planning Cell and instructed it to act as a
contact and co-ordination point between
contributing states and the headquarters
commanding the operation.
The Council continued to monitor the situa-
tion in Rwanda in the light of the decisions
of the United Nations Security Council. "
But in reality, internal institutional differences
within the Council have prevented WEU from
making a joint contribution to alleviating suffe-
ring in that country, and have thus again demons-
trated that it is not yet ready to become a serious





71. In a period in which the consequences of
the radical changes in the political landscape
throughout the world make it more and more dif-
ficult to find appropriate common strategies for
redefining and achieving a reliable world order of
stability, peace and security commensurate with
the new challenges, it is particularly embarrassing
that the United Nations, the only universal organi-
sation with a legitimate vocation attaining this
goal, finds itself in the throes of a serious crisis of
credibility. Fifty years after its foundation, the
United Nations certainly needs substantial
reform, but the overall aim of this reform should
be to do the utmost to save this organisation as the
only global organisation we have for managing
conflicts on a worldwide scale.
72. Trying to overburden the necessary reform
work by unduly ambitious projects could easily
lead to a failure. It is crucial to enhance and not
diminish the confidence of the United Nations
countries which do not belong to the small club of
the privileged industrial and highly-developed
" frst world " that the United Nations is a frame-
work in which they are heard and in which they
have a say.
73. At the same time it is essential for the West
not to lose interest in the future of the United
Nations. The necessary reform of this organisa-
tion can be achieved only if North America and
Europe agree on a joint approach to this question.
This topic should figure prominently in the trans-
atlantic dialogue. Europe must convince the Ame-
ricans that the actual trend in the United States
Congress and in the administration to restrict the
commitments of the United States to the United
Nations according to criteria of purely internal
policy considerations, would have disastrous
consequences in setting precedents which other
westem countries might be tempted to follow.
Furthermore, the consequences of the attitude of
Russia, China and Japan, some of the most impor-
tant non-western powers in the framework of the
United Nations, would be unpredictable.
74. Regarding the future r6le of Europe, mean-
ing first and foremost the European Union and
Western European Union as an integral part of the
process of the development of this union, its
contribution for establishing a new world order
for peace and security is still characterised by a
gap between ambition and reality. Many Euro-
pean countries have a good record of contribu-
tions for international peace-keeping with large
military contingents in several troublespots,
mainly in former Yugoslavia. However, Euro-
peans still have dfficulties in speaking with one
voice in international crisis-prevention and crisis-
management. It would therefore be highly appre-
ciated if the European Union would request
WEU, on the basis of Article J.4, paragraph 2, of
the Maastricht Treaty, to elaborate a concept of
crisis-management in the context of a necessary
reform of the United Nations Charter, or if WEU
were to make relevant proposals of its own.
75. Several subjects should be included in the
agenda of a common European policy in this
context: first the question of the rdle of regional
United Nations organisations in the framework of
international crisis-management, in particular the
division of responsibilities between the OSCE
and the United Nations, a subject which could not
be settled at the Budapest summit meeting of the
CSCE. Second, the question of whether the Uni-
ted Nations should create its own rapid reaction
force as its Secretary-General has again reques-
ted, or whether a better solution is to ask organi-
sations with sophisticated military structures such
as NATO or WEU which is about to become ope-
rational for " Petersberg missions " to conduct the
necessary operations on a mandate from the Uni-
ted Nations or the OSCE. Your Rapporteur has a
clear preference for the latter alternative.
76. This will require an early solution to the
question of whether NATO should be developed
so as to become more involved in international
crisis-management or whether this should become
a major future task for WEU. In any case, the
European and transatlantic institutions must prove
that they are able to make valuable contributions
to the solution of conflicts threatening internatio-
nal peace and security. Otherwise there is a real
danger that international policy may revert to the
practice of using ad hoc alliances with regularly-
changing participants, the consequence being a
renationalisation of foreign and securiry policy.
Tuming back to the year of 1905 and trying a kind
of 'o neo-realpolitik " should not be the future
remedy for international crisis-management.
Regarding the r61e of WEU, the organisation has
still not yet reached a suitable level in the deve-
lopment of its operational capabilities to be able
to exercise major duties in the framework of inter-
national peace-keeping, further to the goals set in
its Petersberg declaration. [n order to fulfil these
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